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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 




STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
 
 This appeal concerns the constitutional validity of New 
Jersey's solid waste regulatory scheme.  Atlantic Coast 
Demolition and Recycling, Inc. ("Atlantic Coast") sought to 
enjoin enforcement of New Jersey's waste flow regulations on the 
ground they violate the dormant Commerce Clause.  The district 
court entered judgment in favor of defendant New Jersey 
Department of Environmental Protection and Energy ("the 
Department"), finding that the flow control regulations did not 
impose an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.  
Atlantic Coast appealed.  We will reverse. 
 Shortly after the district court entered final judgment 
upholding the flow control regulations, the Supreme Court issued 
its decision in C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. 
Ct. 1677 (1994), in which the Court struck down a local flow 
control ordinance of the Town of Clarkstown, New York, as 
violative of the dormant Commerce Clause.  In light of the 
Supreme Court's recent teachings, we conclude that the district 
court erred in holding that the regulations do not discriminate 
against interstate commerce and in applying the balancing test 
set forth in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). 
Because the district court did not consider whether the 
regulations could pass muster under the stricter dormant Commerce 
Clause test applicable to discriminatory measures, we will vacate 
the district court's judgment and remand so that the district 
court may determine whether the regulations can be upheld despite 
their discriminatory effect.1 
 
 I. 
 The facts of this case are generally not in dispute.2  
The necessary factual background concerns New Jersey's waste 
management system and Atlantic Coast's activities.  
                     
1
. The district court had jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as the constitutionality of state 
regulations was challenged and we have jurisdiction over this 
appeal from the district court's final judgment pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
2
. While the Department argues that some of the district 
court's findings of fact were clearly erroneous, the "facts" it 
takes issue with actually involve the district court's 
application of the governing legal principles to the facts, which 
we discuss infra.  The factual background summarized by the 
district court in its oral opinion of September 8, 1993, is 
supported by the record and is therefore not clearly erroneous.  
See Cox v. Keystone Carbon Co., 894 F.2d 647, 650 (3d Cir.) (the 
reviewing court is not to substitute its own findings for that of 
the district court, but "may only make an assessment of whether 
  A.  New Jersey's Solid Waste Management System 
 New Jersey has an extensive statutory and regulatory 
system governing the management and disposal of solid waste.  
This highly regulated system grew out of a crisis that began in 
the 1970s as a result of wide-spread illegal practices in the 
then private, unregulated waste disposal market and the closing 
of many landfills due to unsanitary conditions and noncompliance 
with newly enacted federal regulations.  This crisis has been 
documented in the caselaw of both this court and the New Jersey 
courts.  See, e.g., J. Filiberto Sanitation v. Department of 
Envtl. Protection, 857 F.2d 913, 918-19 (3d Cir. 1988); Trade 
Waste Management Ass'n, Inc. v. Hughey, 780 F.2d 221, 223 (3d 
Cir. 1985); A.A. Mastrangelo, Inc. v. Commissioner of Department 
of Envtl. Protection, 449 A.2d 516, 518-19, 521 (N.J. 1982); 
Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill 
Auth., 348 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1975), rev'd sub nom. City of 
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1977); Southern Ocean 
Landfill, Inc. v. Mayor & Council of the Township of Ocean, 314 
A.2d 65, 66-67 (N.J. 1974); In re Scioscia, 524 A.2d 855, 857 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987).  As the Department has observed 
in a recent update to its Statewide Solid Waste Management Plan: 
 
  By the early 1980s, the department had 
closed, or was in the process of closing, 
over 300 unsafe or unregulated landfills that 
posed serious environmental hazards or had 
(..continued) 
there is enough evidence to support such findings"), cert. 
denied, 498 U.S. 811 (1990). 
exhausted capacity.  However, the 
department's persistent actions to implement 
rigorous environmental standards on landfill 
construction and operations, coupled with a 
steady influx of millions of tons of waste 
annually from neighboring states during the 
1970s, resulted in a serious shortfall of 
disposal capacity in the state. . . .  
 
  By the late 1980s, the "solid waste 
crisis" had become a national issue, and New 
Jersey, the most densely populated state in 
the union, was at the forefront of both the 
problem and the solution.  Responding to the 
need to develop safe, efficient systems, by 
1990 the state/county planning process 
produced 13 new major disposal facilities . . 
. . Despite this remarkable progress, 
however, a number of additional counties were 
forced by the continuing capacity shortages 
to make disposal arrangements with out-of-
state facilities, and New Jersey, once a net 
importer of waste, became a net exporter with 
peak exports of 28% of all solid waste 
generated in the state in 1988.  As national 
attention focused on the environmental 
concerns associated with solid waste 
management practices, a number of states 
moved to restrict the importation of waste.  
On several occasions, New Jersey waste was 
banned, without notice, from out-of-state 
facilities, resulting in serious disruptions 
of service and unhealthy conditions as waste 
collected in the streets. 
New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection and Energy, Div. of Solid 
Waste Management, Solid Waste Management State Plan Update: 1993-
2002, Executive Summary 1-2 (Draft Jan. 1993) (App. 511-12) 
[hereinafter State Plan Update-Executive Summary].   
 New Jersey's existing statutory and regulatory waste 
management system is the result of attempts to respond to this 
crisis.3  The two major statutory provisions of New Jersey's 
solid waste management system are the Solid Waste Management Act 
("SWMA"), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 13:1E-1 to -207 (West 1991 & Supp. 
1994), and the Solid Waste Utility Control Act ("SWUCA"), N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 48:13A-1 to -13 (West Supp. 1994).  These acts were 
passed in 1970 to establish a statutory framework to coordinate 
"all solid waste collection, disposal, and utilization activity" 
in the state, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 13:1E-2(b)(1) (West 1991), and to 
regulate the rates at which these services are provided as a 
means of providing safe, adequate, and proper waste management 
services, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 48:13A-2 (West Supp. 1994).   
 The Department is vested with broad regulatory 
authority,4 while direct management responsibility is delegated 
to the twenty-two solid waste management districts that comprise 
the state, one for each of New Jersey's counties plus the 
Hackensack Meadowlands District.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 13:1D-19 
(West 1991).  Each solid waste district is responsible for 
developing a ten-year solid waste management plan that must be 
approved by the Department before it is implemented.  Id. 
                     
3
. An attempt to conserve landfill space by instituting a 
qualified ban on the importation of solid waste was struck down 
by the United States Supreme Court as violative of the dormant 
Commerce Clause in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 
617 (1977). 
4
. Solid waste management functions delegated to the Board 
of Public Utilities were transferred to the Department in 1991.  
See Reorganization Plan No. 002-1991, set out as note under N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 13:1D-1 (West 1991).   
§§ 13:1E-20, 13:1E-24 (West 1991).  In each waste district, solid 
waste disposal is managed either directly by the county 
government or by municipal authorities created and designated by 
the district for this purpose.5  Each district's waste plan must 
provide for "sufficient [and] suitable" disposal facilities to 
treat and accommodate all solid waste generated within the waste 
district; the districts may meet this obligation by contracting 
with public or private entities or by constructing and operating 
the waste facilities themselves.  Id. § 13:1E-21 to -22 (West 
1991); §§ 40:14B-19 (West 1991), 40:37A-55 (West 1991), 40:37C-5 
(West 1991).  By the early 1980s the Department had approved 
solid waste management plans for each of the twenty-two solid 
waste districts.  State Plan Update-Executive Summary, supra, at 
1 (App. 511).   
 In addition to this system of local district 
management, the disposal facilities6 themselves are subject to 
state regulation by the Department.  The private or public entity 
                     
5
. These local agencies may be municipal utilities 
authorities, county improvement authorities, or pollution control 
financing authorities.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 40:14B-1, -22.1 
(West 1991 & Supp. 1994); 40:37A-103 (West Supp. 1994); 40:37C-3 
(West 1991).  Five of the waste districts manage through county 
control while eleven use the utilities authority model and the 
remaining six use either county improvement or pollution control 
financing authorities. 
6
. Disposal facilities include transfer stations (at which 
solid waste is transferred from collection vehicles to haulage 
vehicles for transportation to an offsite disposal facility), 
resource recovery centers (which engage in both recycling and 
waste disposal), sanitary landfills, and incinerators.  N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 48:13A-3 (West Supp. 1994).  
performing the disposal service must register with and obtain 
approval from the Department before providing disposal service, 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 13:1E-5 (West 1991), and must obtain a 
certificate of public convenience and necessity from the Board of 
Regulatory Commissioners, id. § 48:13A-6 (West Supp. 1994).  To 
register with the Department, a waste disposal facility must 
obtain a solid waste permit which is granted only after review of 
the appropriateness of the facility's location, its effect on the 
surrounding community, and its consistency with the state and 
district solid waste plans.  N.J. Admin. Code tit. 7, §§ 26-2.3 
to -2.4; 26-2.8 to -2.9.  Waste disposal permits are also 
conditioned on the facility's operator satisfying the "integrity" 
requirements contained in N.J. Stat. Ann. § 13:1E-126 to -135 
(West 1991 & Supp. 1994),7 and only disposal facilities included 
in a district plan will receive operating permits, id. § 13:1E-4, 
-26 (West 1991 & Supp. 1994). 
 Additionally, all disposal facilities are regulated on 
the state level as public utilities.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 13:1E-27 
(West Supp. 1994).  Pursuant to traditional utility regulation, 
the disposal facilities must therefore provide their services at 
just and reasonable rates, id. § 48:13A-2 (West Supp. 1994), in a 
nondiscriminatory manner, id. § 48:3-3, -4 (West Supp. 1994), and 
may not abandon or discontinue service without authorization, id. 
§ 48:2-24 (West 1969).  Nor may the solid waste facilities adjust 
                     
7
. These requirements were enacted in response to the 
illegal anti-competitive activities that previously existed 
within the private waste industry. 
their rates without regulatory approval.  Id. § 48:2-21 (West 
1969).   
 Like waste disposal, solid waste collection was originally 
regulated under the utility structure as well, but pursuant to the 
Solid Waste Collection Regulatory Reform Act, which became effective 
in 1992, waste collection services will no longer be regulated as 
public utilities, although they will continue to be under the 
supervision of the Board of Regulatory Commissioners.  See N.J. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 48:13A-7.1 to 48:13A-7.23 (West Supp. 1994).  Thus, although 
waste collection rates will no longer be regulated, a company will 
still be required to register and obtain a certificate of public 
convenience before performing waste collection services in the state.  
See id. § 13:1E-5(a) (West 1991); id. § 48:13A-6 (West Supp. 1994).  
Full rate deregu- lation of the waste collection industry will occur 
in April 1996.8   
 Additionally, the Board of Regulatory Commissioners may 
designate a district as a solid waste disposal franchise area to 
be served by one or more entities engaged in waste disposal.  
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 48:13A-5 (West Supp. 1994).  According to the 
Department, such franchises have been awarded to most of the 
districts and public authorities responsible for the waste 
                     
8
. Under the former rate regulation system, the regulated 
rate for government-owned disposal facilities became, by 
operation of law, a component of the tariff of all solid waste 
collectors.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 48:13A-7.8 (West Supp. 1994).  
This aspect of the system will continue until full deregulation 
in 1996. 
districts' solid waste management.9  A franchise grants a solid 
waste disposal facility the "exclusive right to control and 
provide for the disposal of solid waste, except for recyclable 
material whenever markets for those materials are available, 
within a district or districts" as long as the proposed franchise 
is consistent with the district's solid waste plan.  Id.  The 
district government or public authority, as franchisee, may 
operate the disposal facility itself, or contract with another 
district or with a private facility. 
 As an integral part of the district plan and utility 
regulation system, the Department and waste districts are 
authorized under the SWMA and SWUCA to direct the flow of waste 
to designated facilities.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 48:13A-4(c) (West 
Supp. 1994); Op. N.J. Att'y Gen. No. 3 (1980).  It is the 
resultant waste flow regulations that Atlantic Coast challenges 
in this action.  The waste flow requirements enable the waste 
districts to control the processing and disposal of all solid 
waste generated within the district.  See Op. N.J. Att'y Gen.  
No. 3 (1980).  The district plans specify to which disposal 
facility the waste from each of New Jersey's 567 municipalities 
is directed, and these designations are codified as Department 
regulations.  N.J. Admin. Code tit. 7, § 26-6.5.   
 These waste flow measures do not apply to separated 
recyclable materials.  N.J. Admin. Code tit. 7, § 26-1.1(a)(1).  
                     
9
. Amici Hudson County Improvement Authority, Passaic 
County Utilities Authority, and Essex County Utilities Authority 
have all been awarded such franchises. 
The separation of recyclables from other waste at the source of 
the waste and the marketing of recyclables may be performed 
competitively by private entities, and these activities are 
subject to much less stringent overall regulation than waste 
management services.  See, e.g., N.J. Admin. Code tit.7, §§ 26A-
1.4(a)(2) (exemption of traditional recyclables from Department 
approval process), 26A-3.1 (regulation of nontraditional 
recyclables).  Mixed waste, because it contains both waste and 
recyclables and therefore presents environmental risks not 
associated with separated recyclables, is subject to the waste 
flow regulations.  Under recently promulgated regulations that 
memorialize the Department's previously informal "Pereira 
policy," mixed-waste generated within a waste district may be 
removed from the district for separation without initial 
processing at the designated disposal facility, as long as the 
nonrecyclable residue, or a similar kind and amount, is returned 
to the designated disposal facility, or if, in lieu of returning 
any residue waste, a payment equal to the tipping fees that would 
otherwise be due for the nonrecyclable portion is paid to that 
facility.  N.J. Admin. Code tit. 7, §§ 26-6.9, 26-2B.9.   
 The disposal charges, or tipping fees10 charged by the 
designated waste facilities are used for operating revenues.  
See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40:14B-22.1 (West Supp. 1994).  
                     
10
. Tipping fees are the rates that a disposal facility or 
transfer station charges the hauler who deposits waste at the 
facility.  J. Filiberto Sanitation v. Department of Envtl. 
Protection, 857 F.2d 913, 916 (3d Cir. 1988). 
Because the county governments and public authorities that manage 
these facilities may raise funds for capital construction by 
issuing revenue bonds, the tipping fees may also be pledged 
toward repayment of the bonds.  According to the Department, 
approximately $1.6 billion in revenue debt has been issued by and 
remains outstanding to the county governments and authorities.  
The tipping fees are set by the Board of Regulatory Commissioners 
at a rate that will enable the waste district to recover the 
costs associated with its solid waste management plan, including 
costs associated with disposal and recycling.  See N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 48:13A-6.3 (West Supp. 1994).  Because the districts are 
engaged in aggressive disposal management and recycling programs, 
the tipping fees are quite high.  Thus, it is often less 
expensive to dispose of solid waste generated in New Jersey at 
facilities located in a neighboring state, even when 
transportation costs to transport the waste to the out-of-state 
facility are factored in. 
 The disposal facilities are designated through the 
district planning process.  N.J. Admin. Code tit. 7, § 26-6.6.   
The designated facilities may be located within the waste 
district, in another waste district pursuant to an interdistrict 
plan, or out-of-state.  Thus, a district plan can propose a 
contract with an out-of-state disposal facility.  However, 
district plans must be approved by the Department and the 
Department candidly acknowledges that the twin "goals of 60% 
recycling and disposal self-sufficiency for the nonrecyclable 
waste stream . . . form the core of New Jersey's current solid 
waste management system and constitute the statewide solid waste 
management objectives, criteria and standards with which the 
[district] plans must be consistent."  Appellee's Br. at 11.  
Thus, as the district court found: 
  Although it is not the subject of a 
clear legislative direction [sic], it is 
equally clear that the D.E.P.E. administers 
the law with the specific goal that all waste 
generated in New Jersey be disposed of within 
the borders of the state.  The 1993 solid 
waste management state plan update, which was 
admitted into evidence and herein referred to 
as the Update, provides:  "As a key policy 
objective, New Jersey will continue to move 
toward achievement of self-sufficiency in 
disposal capacity.  The Department's 
objective is to eliminate reliance on out-of-
state disposal within a seven-year period." 
App. 1017.  
 Accordingly, a waste district that is unable to 
identify sufficient existing waste facilities or suitable sites 
within the district, or within another district pursuant to an 
interdistrict agreement, to meet the district's waste needs must 
certify to the Department the absence of suitable in-district 
sites and the failure to reach an interdistrict agreement.  See 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 13:1E-21 (West 1991).  Only after such a 
certification, can a waste district plan that designates an out-
of-state disposal site receive Department approval.  In re Long-
Term Out-of-State Waste Disposal Agreement Between County of 
Hunterdon & Glendon Energy Commission, 568 A.2d 547, 551-53 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div.), certif. denied, 583 A.2d 337 (1990).11  
Thus, the designation process is intended to favor operators that 
have facilities already located within, or those that are willing 
to construct a facility within, the state.   
 
 B.  Atlantic Coast's Activities 
 Atlantic Coast is a Pennsylvania corporation that was 
formed in 1989 to operate a transfer station and recycling center 
for construction and demolition ("C & D") debris.  This facility 
                     
11
. As quoted in In re Waste Disposal Agreement, the 1985 
Update to the Statewide Solid Waste Management Plan contained the 
following statement: 
 
  "The Department considers the use of 
out-of-state disposal facilities to be 
inappropriate as a long-range solid waste 
management option. . . .  
 
  The uncertainty inherent in use of out-
of-state facilities conflicts with the 
philosophy of the Solid Waste Management Act, 
which is that districts should be able to 
plan for and predict the availability of 
disposal capacity to meet their needs.  The 
Department has allowed several districts to 
rely upon out-of-state facilities, as a 
short-term option, in cases where districts 
have not been able to secure interdistrict 
agreements for access to in-state capacity.  
However, it is critical that districts which 
do rely on out-of-state disposal capacity, 
secure enforceable assurances from those 
facilities in order to ensure continued use 
until in-state facilities can be brought on 
line.  It is equally critical that those 
districts develop an in-state solution as 
quickly as practicable." 
 
In re Waste Disposal Agreement, 568 A.2d at 551.   
is located in Philadelphia.  Atlantic Coast is licensed by the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Environmental 
Resources to accept for processing at its facility various types 
of construction and demolition debris, including uncontaminated 
rock, soil, ferrous metals, and wood; recyclables; and 
unmarketable construction and demolition materials.  Atlantic 
Coast processes the C & D debris by separating the recyclable 
materials from the nonrecyclable.  The nonrecyclable residue 
waste is then shipped to landfills for disposal.  During periods 
relevant to this appeal, Atlantic Coast was transporting the 
nonrecyclable waste to a landfill in Ohio.  The majority of the 
waste processed at the Atlantic Coast facility is not recyclable; 
by weight only approximately eight and one-half to twenty percent 
of the waste is recycled.12  Thus, most of the materials received 
by Atlantic Coast are shipped to a landfill for disposal. 
 Construction and demolition debris is generated when a 
building is constructed, demolished, or refurbished.  It is not 
composed of a single material, but is rather a mixture of 
recyclable and nonrecyclable materials.  As a practical matter,  
C & D waste is not source separated, that is, the generator of 
the debris does not separate out the recyclable materials at the 
construction site.  Prior to separation the mixture of recyclable 
and nonrecyclable materials is considered waste, but once the 
                     
12
. This figure varies depending on whether wood is 
included as a recyclable material.  Atlantic Coast was at one 
time stockpiling the wood at its facility for a particular 
purchaser, but it appears that in the absence of that arrangement 
the wood is disposed of as waste. 
recyclable portion is separated out, only the remaining 
nonrecyclable portion is considered waste.  Thus, if Atlantic 
Coast collects C & D debris from a construction site in New 
Jersey and transports it to its facility for separation and 
processing, the waste it collects is subject to New Jersey waste 
flow regulations.  This means that it is required by those 
regulations to return the nonrecyclable waste (or equivalent 
waste) to the source district's designated disposal facility or 
to pay to that facility an amount equal to the tipping fee it 
would pay if it returned that portion of the C & D debris to the 
designated facility. 
 Because of its proximity to New Jersey's southern 
counties, Atlantic Coast sought to gain access to the New 
Jersey's C & D debris market, but its efforts to be included as a 
designated facility in a district waste management plan were 
unsuccessful.  Atlantic Coast rejected the alternate means of 
serving the New Jersey market, i.e., returning the residual waste 
to the designated facilities for processing, or paying a 
compensating fee, as too costly.  Following its unsuccessful 
efforts to serve the New Jersey market, Atlantic Coast filed an 
action in the district court challenging the constitutionality of 
New Jersey's solid waste flow control regulations.13     
                     
13
.  In addition to the Commissioner of the New Jersey 
Department of Environmental Protection and Energy, Atlantic Coast 
named as defendants two county governments--the Board of Chosen 
Freeholders of Atlantic County and the Board of Chosen 
Freeholders of Camden County, and the solid waste authorities 
within those counties--the Atlantic County Utilities Authority 
and the Pollution Control Financing Authority of Camden County.  
Atlantic Coast subsequently reached a settlement agreement with 
 In its complaint, Atlantic Coast sought a declaration 
that the district waste plans identified in the flow control 
regulations violate the Commerce Clause and a permanent 
injunction barring the defendants from prohibiting or interfering 
with the transportation of construction and demolition debris 
from its generation or collection within New Jersey, or in 
Atlantic and Camden Counties in particular, to facilities outside 
the state.  Although the scope of Atlantic Coast's attack on the 
New Jersey solid waste management system was somewhat unclear 
from the complaint, the district court concluded that Atlantic 
Coast's main contention centered on the waste flow regulations.  
At oral argument before this court, counsel for Atlantic Coast 
reiterated that its dormant Commerce Clause allegation and its 
claim for relief were limited to the waste flow regulations, and 
in particular the requirement that residual waste from mixed 
waste loads be returned to each district's designated facility 
unless the facility is compensated for the lost waste revenue. 
 
 C.  The District Court Proceedings 
 Atlantic Coast moved for a preliminary injunction.   
Following a short period of intense discovery, an evidentiary 
hearing was held on Atlantic Coast's motion, at which a 
substantial amount of deposition and live testimony was admitted. 
(..continued) 
the county and authority defendants, pursuant to which those 
defendants would not participate in the district court action or 
in any appeals, but would be bound by the court's determination.  
The Department therefore became the sole remaining defendant.  
The district court promptly issued an opinion declining to enter 
a preliminary injunction.  After further discovery, the parties 
elected to submit the case on its merits based on the preliminary 
injunction record without supplementation.  Ultimately, the 
district court entered final judgment in the Department's favor 
based on the findings and conclusions in its oral opinion of 
September 8, 1993.  This appeal followed.14 
 
 II. 
 The fundamental issue presented by this appeal is 
whether the district court erred in concluding that the New 
Jersey regulatory waste flow scheme does not violate the dormant 
Commerce Clause.  To determine this fundamental issue, three 
subsidiary issues must be decided: (1) whether the district court 
erred in applying the Pike balancing test, rather than what we 
                     
14
. This court granted a stay pending the Supreme Court's 
disposition in C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown.  After 
the Supreme Court issued its opinion on May 16, 1994, 
invalidating the Clarkstown waste flow ordinance, Atlantic Coast 
filed a motion with this court for summary reversal of the 
district court's final order or expedited disposition of the 
appeal.  We denied the motion for summary reversal but expedited 
the appeal.  Amicus curiae briefs were submitted in support of 
the Department's position by Hudson County Improvement Authority, 
Passaic County Utilities Authority, Essex County Utilities 
Authority, and Mercer County Improvement Authority ("Hudson 
County Amici"); by Cape May County Municipal Utilities Authority; 
and by the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources.  
An amicus curiae brief in support of Atlantic Coast's position 
was submitted by the City of Jersey City, the Borough of 
Northvale, C & A Carbone, Inc., National Solid Wastes Management 
Association, and Waste Management Association of New Jersey ("the 
Municipal and Trade Association Amici").  Additionally, we 
granted the Hudson County Amici leave to participate in oral 
argument. 
have termed the "heightened scrutiny" test,15 (2) whether the New 
Jersey waste flow regulations are excepted from the strictures of 
Commerce Clause scrutiny under the market participant doctrine, 
and (3) if not, whether these regulations meet the applicable 
Commerce Clause test in light of New Jersey's particular 
circumstances.  We conclude that New Jersey's waste flow 
regulations, in effect and by design, discriminate against 
interstate commerce and that heightened scrutiny under the 
dormant Commerce Clause is required.  We reject the Department's 
argument that New Jersey's regulation of waste disposal through a 
utility system requires application of the less stringent 
balancing test, and likewise reject its argument that New Jersey 
is entitled to the market participant exception.  Because the 
district court did not consider whether the waste flow 
regulations can be upheld despite their discriminatory effect, we 
will remand to the district court so that it may make this 
determination in the first instance. 
 
 III. 
 The Commerce Clause grants to Congress the affirmative 
power "[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States."  
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  "Although the Clause thus speaks 
in terms of powers bestowed upon Congress, the [Supreme] Court 
long has recognized that it also limits the power of the States 
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.  See Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Oberly, 822 F.2d 388 (3d 
Cir. 1987). 
to erect barriers against interstate trade."  Lewis v. BT 
Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 35 (1980).  The negative 
or dormant aspects of the Commerce Clause that limit state 
authority apply to subject areas in which "Congress has not 
affirmatively acted to either authorize or forbid the challenged 
state activity."  Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Oberly, 822 F.2d 388, 
392 (3d Cir. 1987).  Thus, any state regulation of interstate 
commerce is subject to scrutiny under the dormant Commerce Clause 
unless such regulation has been preempted or expressly authorized 
by Congress.  The district court held that Congress has 
legislated in the area of solid waste disposal but "expressly 
left to the states the primary role in the collection and 
disposal of solid waste."  App. 1015-16 (citing the Waste 
Disposal Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6901(A)(4)).  The parties 
have not advanced either a preemption or authorization argument 
before this court, and we decline to examine the issue further.16  
We therefore turn to the issues of whether and how New Jersey's 
                     
16
. We note, however, that Justice O'Connor, concurring in 
the result reached by the C & A Carbone Court, recently rejected 
the argument that the federal Waste Disposal Act authorizes 
discriminatory solid waste measures.  C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town 
of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1691 (1994) (O'Connor, J., 
concurring in the judgment).  The district court's determination 
that Congress has authorized concurrent state legislation in the 
area of solid waste management is not inconsistent with Justice 
O'Connor's conclusion that discriminatory measures are not 
authorized.  We note further that several competing federal 
measures that expressly authorized local waste flow restrictions, 
as well as waste importation and exportation bans, were 
introduced during the 103d Congress, but were not enacted into 
law.  At least one of these measures has been introduced for 
consideration by the current Congress as well. 
waste flow regulations affect interstate commerce.  The Supreme 
Court's recent decision in C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of 
Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677 (1994), provides significant guidance 
with respect to these issues, and we begin with a review of the 
opinion of the Court in that case. 
 
 A. 
 The solid waste flow control ordinance before the court 
in C & A Carbone required that all waste within the town of 
Clarkstown, New York, be processed at a designated transfer 
station which the town had caused to be built to comply with a 
consent decree between the town and the New York State Department 
of Environmental Conservation.  C & A Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 
1680.  To finance the new facility, the town entered into an 
arrangement with a local private contractor under which the 
contractor would build the facility, operate it for five years, 
and then turn it over to the town for one dollar.  In return, the 
town guaranteed the contractor a tipping fee of $81.00 per ton 
and guaranteed that a minimum of 120,000 tons of waste would be 
deposited at the transfer station for processing each year.  If 
the total waste brought to the facility was less than 120,000 
tons in any year, the town would make up the difference in the 
lost fees.  Id.   
 To ensure that the contractor would receive the agreed 
upon sums, the town enacted its flow control ordinance.  The town 
was thus assured of customers for the new transfer facility and 
could finance the facility through the mandated tipping fees.   
C & A Carbone, who operated a recycling center within the town, 
was found to be violating the ordinance by transporting waste 
from its facility to out-of-state locations for processing.   
C & A Carbone challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance 
based on the dormant Commerce Clause.  The New York courts 
concluded that the town's ordinance did not discriminate against 
interstate commerce because it applied "evenhandedly to all solid 
waste processed within the Town."  587 N.Y.S. 2d 681, 686 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1992).  The Supreme Court reversed. 
 The Supreme Court first concluded that the ordinance 
did regulate interstate commerce, rejecting the town's contention 
that its flow control did nothing more than delay the entry of 
garbage into the stream of interstate commerce until it was safe.  
The Court noted that Carbone received and processed solid waste 
from out of state, and the requirement that it route that waste 
through the town's transfer station increased the cost of 
processing for out-of-state waste generators.  More importantly 
for present purposes, the Court pointed out that the relevant 
stream of interstate commerce was not the market for solid 
wastes, but rather the market for solid waste processing and 
disposal services.  "[W]hat makes garbage a profitable business 
is not its own worth but the fact that its possessor must pay to 
get rid of it.  In other words, the article of commerce is not so 
much the solid waste itself, but rather the service of processing 
and disposing of it."  C & A Carbone, 114 S.Ct. at 1682. 
 In addition to the effect on the cost to out-of-state 
possessors of garbage, the Court stressed that "even as to waste 
originant in Clarkstown, the ordinance prevents everyone except 
the favored local operator from performing the initial processing 
step" and thus "deprives out-of-state businesses of access to a 
local market."  Id. at 1681.  The conclusion that the ordinance 
affected interstate commerce was, accordingly, inescapable. 
 Having concluded that the town's ordinance affected 
interstate commerce, the Court addressed whether its effect was a 
discriminatory one -- whether it operated to favor local 
commercial interests or disfavor out-of-state ones.  This was 
important because a local measure that discriminates against 
interstate commerce on its face or in effect can be upheld only 
if it falls within "a narrow class of cases in which the 
municipality can demonstrate, under rigorous scrutiny, that it 
has no other means to advance a legitimate local interest."  Id. 
at 1683.  Such protectionist measures are thus subjected to 
heightened scrutiny as compared with local measures that pursue a 
legitimate local interest evenhandedly and impose only an 
incidental burden on interstate commerce.  Nondiscriminatory 
measures will be upheld unless the incidental "burden on 
interstate commerce . . . is 'clearly excessive in relation to 
the putative local benefits.'"  Id. at 1682 (quoting Pike v. 
Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).  Because the Court 
found the "practical effect and design" of the Clarkstown 
ordinance discriminatory, it held that heightened scrutiny was 
required and that the Pike balancing test was inappropriate.  See 
id. at 1684. 
 Clarkstown's flow control ordinance regulated the local 
market for solid waste processing services in a protectionist 
manner.  It allowed only the favored operation to process waste 
located within the limits of the town and the Court found this 
"no less discriminatory because in-state or in-town processors 
are also covered by the prohibition."  Id. at 1682.  In support 
of these conclusions, the Court cited Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 
340 U.S. 349 (1951), which involved a dormant Commerce Clause 
challenge to a city ordinance requiring that all milk sold in the 
city be pasteurized within five miles of the city limits.  The 
ordinance was held to be an unjustifiable protectionist measure 
because it favored milk processors located within a five-mile 
radius.  The Dean Milk court found "immaterial [the fact] that 
Wisconsin milk from outside the [local] area [was] subjected to 
the same proscription as that moving in interstate commerce."  
Dean Milk, 340 U.S. at 354 n.4, quoted in, C & A Carbone, 114  
S. Ct. at 1682. 
 The Clarkstown ordinance was found to be "just one more 
instance of local processing requirements that . . . long have 
[been] held invalid."  Id. at 1682.  Citing a long line of cases 
in which local processing requirements had been stricken, the 
Court described the evil there addressed and the evil of 
Clarkstown's flow control ordinance as follows: 
 The essential vice in laws of this sort is 
that they bar the import of the processing 
service.  Out-of-state meat inspectors, or 
shrimp hullers, or milk pasteurizers, are 
deprived of access to local demand for their 
services.  Put another way, the offending 
local laws hoard a local resource -- be it 
meat, shrimp, or milk -- for the benefit of 
local businesses that treat it. 
 
  The flow control ordinance has the same 
design and effect.  It hoards solid waste, 
and the demand to get rid of it, for the 
benefit of the preferred processing facility.  
The only conceivable distinction from the 
cases cited above is that the flow control 
ordinance favors a single local proprietor.  
But this difference just makes the 
protectionist effect of the ordinance more 
acute.  In Dean Milk, the local processing 
requirement at least permitted pasteurizers 
within five miles of the city to compete.  An 
out-of-state pasteurizer who wanted access to 
that market might have built a pasteurizing 
facility within the radius.  The flow control 
ordinance at issue here squelches competition 
in the waste-processing service altogether, 
leaving no room for investment from outside. 
114 S. Ct. at 1683. 
 Having determined that heightened scrutiny rather than 
interest balancing was appropriate, the Court held that 
Clarkstown had "any number of nondiscriminatory alternatives for 
addressing the health and environmental problems alleged to 
justify the ordinance in question."  Id. at 1683.  In the course 
of so holding, the Court recognized that the flow control 
ordinance was adopted by the town as a means of financing the 
construction of a needed processing facility.  This did not aid 
the town case, however, because there was a non-discriminatory 
alternative available: 
  Clarkstown maintains that special 
financing is necessary to ensure the long-
term survival of the designated facility.  If 
so, the town may subsidize the facility 
through general taxes or municipal bonds.  
But having elected to use the open market to 
earn revenues for its project, the town may 
not employ discriminatory regulation to give 
that project an advantage over rival 
businesses from out of State. 
114 S. Ct. at 1684 (citation omitted). 
 
 B. 
 New Jersey's flow control regulations accomplish on a 
district level substantially what Clarkstown's flow control 
ordinance accomplished on a local level.  They favor the 
district's designated facilities at the expense of out-of-state 
providers of processing and disposal services that would 
otherwise compete for the opportunity to service solid waste 
generated within the district.  Here, as in C & A Carbone and 
Dean Milk, it is immaterial that the designated facilities are 
favored over other in-state facilities as well as over out-of-
state ones.  Similarly, it is irrelevant here, as in Dean Milk, 
that an out-of-state firm willing to build an in-district 
facility is entitled to compete to have that facility become a 
designated facility.  Like the governmental entities in the other 
cases involving local processing requirements, New Jersey is 
regulating a market which the Commerce Clause intended to be open 
to non-local competitors.  More specifically, New Jersey is 
regulating the market for solid waste processing and disposal 
services in each of the districts by directing district consumers 
of those services to utilize a favored service provider who, in 
the absence of exceptional circumstances, operates a local 
facility.  It necessarily follows, we conclude, that any Commerce 
Clause analysis of New Jersey's flow control regulations must 
employ the heightened scrutiny test and that the district court 
erred by subjecting them only to the balancing test of Pike.17 
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. In applying the Pike test, the district court relied on 
J. Filiberto Sanitation v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 857 
F.2d 913 (3d Cir. 1988).  We there found that a requirement that 
all waste generated in a county be processed at the county's 
  C. 
 It is true, as the Department stresses, that New Jersey 
has not placed an absolute bar on the utilization of out-of-state 
facilities as designated facilities.  This, however, does not 
transform a fundamentally discriminatory scheme into a non-
discriminatory one.  While out-of-state facilities can compete to 
become designated facilities, the Department acknowledges that it 
approves district plans only if they are consistent with the 
"core" goal of having all of New Jersey's solid waste processed 
and disposed of in New Jersey within the next five years.  This 
can be accomplished, and is being accomplished, only by selecting 
existing and proposed in-state facilities whenever possible.  In 
short, out-of-state facilities do not compete on anything 
approaching a level playing field.  Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 112 S. 
Ct. 789, 801 (1992) ("The volume of commerce affected measures 
only the extent of the discrimination; it is of no relevance to 
the determination whether a State has discriminated against 
interstate commerce."). 
 In reaching our conclusion that the appropriate 
Commerce Clause measuring rod is heightened scrutiny, we have not 
(..continued) 
transfer station did not have any effect on interstate commerce 
because the waste entered the interstate market after processing, 
and then noted that the rule would have met the Pike test as 
well.  Our holding that the waste flow restriction did not affect 
interstate commerce is inconsistent with C & A Carbone and is 
therefore overruled.  To the extent Filiberto can be read to 
authorize the application of the Pike balancing test to New 
Jersey's waste flow regulations it is also inconsistent with  
C & A Carbone and is overruled.   
been unmindful of the Department's insistence that the public 
utility aspects of New Jersey's solid waste system distinguish 
the flow control regulations here from the Clarkstown ordinance. 
In substance, the Department urges that (1) Clarkstown's transfer 
station was not a regulated public utility; (2) New Jersey's 
designated facilities are regulated public utilities; (3) what 
Atlantic Coast finds objectionable in the waste flow regulations 
-- the monopoly and resulting captive customer base of the 
designated facilities -- is inherent in any public utility 
regulatory scheme; (4) Commerce Clause analysis in the context of 
state public utility regulation has consistently employed the 
balancing test of Pike; and (5) state public utility regulation 
is upheld where, as here, the burdens on commerce are not 
disproportionate to the local benefits. 
 While we agree with the Department's first three 
propositions, we do not read the dormant Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence to suggest that state utility regulation is to be 
judged by different standards than other state regulation.  When 
state utility regulation is protectionist, the Supreme Court has 
employed heightened scrutiny; where it is not, a benefits and 
burdens analysis has been applied. 
 In New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 
331, 334-36 (1982), the Supreme Court reviewed an order of the 
New Hampshire Public Utility Commission that required the New 
England Power Company, a consortium of Connecticut River 
hydroelectric power companies, to reserve for New Hampshire 
residents an amount of power equal to the amount generated by the 
consortium within that state.  The Court found that the 
Commission's order was essentially an "exportation ban" that 
placed a direct and substantial burden on interstate commerce and 
therefore applied the heightened scrutiny test to the 
discriminatory order.  Id. at 339.   
 Subsequently, in Arkansas Electric Cooperative Corp. v. 
Arkansas Public Service Commission, 461 U.S. 375 (1983), in 
rejecting an outdated Commerce Clause utility test that focused 
on whether the state was regulating wholesale or retail sales of 
gas or electricity, the Supreme Court noted:  "Our constitutional 
review of state utility regulation in related contexts has not 
treated it as a special province insulated from our general 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence."  Id. at 391 (citing New England 
Power Co., 455 U.S. 331 (1982)).  The Court then articulated the 
Pike balancing test as "[o]ne recent reformulation of the 
[Court's dormant Commerce Clause] test" and, after noting that 
the regulation at issue did not implicate economic protectionism 
and would involve only an incidental effect on interstate 
commerce, applied the balancing test to conclude that the 
regulation did not violate the Commerce Clause.  Id. at 393-95.18  
Although the Arkansas Electric Court did not expressly 
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. The issue in Arkansas Electric Cooperative Corp. was 
whether the Arkansas Public Service Commission had violated the 
Supremacy or Commerce Clauses by asserting regulatory 
jurisdiction over the wholesale rates that the cooperative 
charged to its retail members, all of whom were located within 
the state.  Wholesale rates charged by cooperatives was one area 
of wholesale electricity sales that the federal legislation and 
rules did not govern.  See 461 U.S. at 377, 381-82. 
characterize the regulation before it as non-discriminatory, the 
Court's opinion can only be read as implicitly rejecting 
application of the heightened scrutiny test because it found no 
discrimination against interstate commerce.   
 More recently, the Supreme Court applied the heightened 
scrutiny test to protectionist state public utility regulation in 
Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 789 (1992).  The state statute 
there under attack required that all coal-fired electricity 
plants located within the state of Oklahoma burn at least ten 
percent Oklahoma mined coal.  The Court concluded that the 
statute discriminated against interstate commerce and struck it 
down under the dormant Commerce Clause, noting that the question 
of which level of scrutiny to apply to the protectionist measure 
was "not a close call."  Id. at 800 n.12. 
 Based on this Supreme Court case law, we reject the 
Department's contention that because the waste flow regulations 
are part of a larger utility regulation system, they are not 
subject to the heightened scrutiny test despite any 
discriminatory effect. 
 We have found only one Supreme Court case in which a 
Commerce Clause challenge was made based on the exclusionary 
effects of a monopoly created by a state public utility 
regulatory scheme.  In that case, Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. 
v. Michigan Public Service Commission, 341 U.S. 329 (1951), the 
Court sustained the state utility commission's refusal to allow 
an out-of-state natural gas supplier to sell natural gas to 
industrial consumers in an area where a Michigan public utility 
had been granted an exclusive certificate of public convenience 
and necessity.  Panhandle is not helpful here, however, because 
it was decided before Arkansas Electric.  As we have noted, the 
Court there rejected the bright line test of cases like Public 
Utilities Commission v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., 273 U.S. 
83 (1927), and Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 
340 U.S. 179 (1950), that regarded state regulation of wholesale 
utility markets as a direct burden on interstate commerce and 
state regulation of retail utility markets as "essentially local" 
in nature and as having only an incidental effect on interstate 
commerce.  The Court in Panhandle Eastern sustained the local gas 
company's monopoly on the authority of Cities Service and the 
wholesale/retail distinction there reflected. 
 Now that the Supreme Court has rejected this 
distinction and made it clear in Arkansas Electric that public 
utilities regulation is not a special category for Commerce 
Clause purposes, it well may be that the heightened scrutiny test 
would be applied to a situation like that presented in Panhandle 
Eastern where an out-of-state firm challenges its exclusion from 
the local franchise market.  A strong argument can be made that 
the rationale in C & A Carbone would require use of this test.  
See 114 S. Ct. at 1682 (finding the ordinance discriminatory 
because "it allows only the favored operator to process waste 
that is within the limits of the town" and "no less 
discriminatory because in-state or in-town processors are also 
covered by the prohibition").  We do not suggest, however, that 
traditional public utilities regulation of retail sales would be 
invalidated by heightened scrutiny.  Where the regulation is 
addressed to a utility, like a local gas utility and unlike 
Atlantic Coast, whose service requires a tangible distribution 
system, a franchise monopoly may be the only economically 
feasible alternative. 
 We note that there is a discriminatory aspect to the 
waste flow control regulations in the context of New Jersey's 
scheme that is not present in a situation like that presented in 
Panhandle Eastern.  A gas or electric utility granted a franchise 
to serve the needs of all residents within a local area is not 
ordinarily required to commit to producing its electricity or 
securing its natural gas supply within that area as well.  
Normally, both in-state and out-of-state interests may, 
therefore, compete equally for the franchise award and the 
creation of a captive consumer base does not, under these 
circumstances, discriminate against electricity and gas generated 
or produced out of state. 
 Under New Jersey's system, collectors of waste -- those 
who supply disposal services at the retail level -- are required 
to secure processing and disposal services from the designated, 
franchised facility and out-of-state disposal firms are thus 
excluded not only from the market for such services during the 
franchise period but also from competing for the franchise.  The 
burden on the flow of services from out of state in the situation 
now before us is thus far greater than the burden on the flow of 
electricity and gas from out-of-state in the traditional public 
utility regulation situation. 
 We thus conclude that the public utility aspects of New 
Jersey's solid waste disposal scheme do not require application 
of the Pike balancing test. 
 
 IV. 
 As an alternative to its argument that the nature of 
the New Jersey waste disposal scheme distinguishes it from the 
ordinance in C & A Carbone and requires that its waste flow 
regulations be subject to a more lenient level of scrutiny, the 
Department contends that the nature of the system earns the 
regulations the protection of the market participant doctrine.  
The Supreme Court has recognized what amounts to an exception 
from the restraints of the dormant Commerce Clause for otherwise 
discriminatory action taken by a governmental entity in its role 
as a market participant, rather than as a market regulator.  The 
market participant doctrine "differentiates between a State's 
acting in its distinctive governmental capacity, and a State's 
acting in the more general capacity of a market participant."  
New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 277 (1988).  
When a governmental entity enters the market place in a capacity 
analogous to that of private market participants and makes 
decisions analogous to those made by private market participants, 
its decisions are not subject to dormant Commerce Clause 
scrutiny.  Thus, "'[t]he Commerce Clause does not prohibit all 
state action designed to give its residents an advantage in the 
marketplace, but only action of that description in connection 
with the State's regulation of interstate commerce.'"  Oregon 
Waste Systems v. Department of Environmental Quality, 114 S. Ct. 
1345, 1354 n.9 (1994) (quoting New Energy Co. of Indiana v. 
Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988)). 
 The Supreme Court has found the market participant 
doctrine to be applicable in only three cases:  Hughes v. 
Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. 794, 808-09, 810 (1976) (upholding a 
program involving  payments by a state for auto scrap where the 
payments were restricted to in-state processors for state-titled 
vehicles); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980) (sustaining 
a restriction on the sale of government-produced cement to state 
residents); and White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction 
Workers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983) (upholding an executive order 
requiring that city residents comprise at least one-half the 
staff of all public works construction projects funded in whole 
or part by city funds or city-administered federal funds).  Two 
important characteristics tie these three cases together.  In 
each situation the government was participating directly in some 
aspect of the market as a purchaser, seller, or producer, and the 
alleged discriminatory effects on the interstate market flowed 
from these market actions. 
 In the solid waste arena, the Supreme Court has not yet 
reviewed a case involving a government-owned waste facility and 
the Court has consequently left unanswered the question as to 
what effect government ownership of a waste facility would have 
on otherwise discriminatory waste measures.  See City of 
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 627 n.6 (reserving the 
question whether a governmental unit who operates a landfill is a 
market participant); Oregon Waste Systems, 114 S. Ct. at 1354 n.9 
(finding impermissibly discriminatory a state statute directing 
private landfills to pass on a mandated surcharge on out-of-state 
generated waste and declining to address the issue whether Oregon 
could accomplish its "cost-spreading" through market 
participation).  This court, however, has applied the market 
participant doctrine in the context of a publicly owned waste 
disposal facility.  In Swin Resource Systems, Inc. v. Lycoming 
County, 883 F.2d 245, 250 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 
1077 (1990), we held that the local government did not violate 
the dormant Commerce Clause by charging at the county-operated 
landfill a higher disposal fee for waste generated outside a 
local area than for locally-generated waste, stating: 
 
  If Maryland may decree that only those 
with Maryland auto hulks will receive state 
bounties, it would seem that Lycoming can 
similarly decree that only local trash will 
be disposed of in its landfill on favorable 
terms.  If South Dakota may give preference 
to local concrete buyers when a severe 
shortage makes that resource scarce, it would 
seem that Lycoming may similarly give 
preference to local garbage (and hence local 
garbage-producing residents) when a shortage 
of disposal sites makes landfills scarce.  
And if Boston may limit jobs to local 
residents, we see no reason why Lycoming may 
not limit preferential use of its landfill to 
local garbage (and hence local garbage-
producing residents). 
Swin Resource Systems, 883 F.2d at 250 (footnote omitted).  We 
held that the county, rather than regulating the waste disposal 
market, was "deciding the conditions under which [a private waste 
processor] could use [the public] landfill."  Id. at 249.  The 
county was simply operating a government facility in a manner 
that favored its own citizens over others, and its activities did 
not have "downstream" effects.19   
 The Department argues that the market participant 
doctrine is applicable here because New Jersey participates (or 
directs local government entities to participate) in the waste 
disposal market as sellers and purchasers of waste disposal 
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. In South-Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 
(1984), a four-justice plurality held that the market participant 
doctrine did not apply to an Alaska regulation requiring in-state 
processing of timber obtained by private companies from state 
forest land because it had the effect of controlling aspects of 
the timber market in which the government, acting as a timber 
seller, did not participant.  467 U.S. at 97-99 (opinion of 
White, J.).  The regulation was thus seen as having impermissible 
"downstream" effects.   
services and disposal capacity.  The districts "sell" waste 
disposal services, according to the Department, through the 
designated disposal facilities.  Where a district has opted not 
to own or operate the designated facilities directly, it 
"purchases" these services for "resale" by contracting with 
private facilities for the provision of waste disposal services.  
Thus, the Department maintains, the waste flow regulations simply 
represent a means by which the state manages the districts' 
market participation and the regulations are therefore protected 
from Commerce Clause scrutiny under the market participant 
doctrine. 
 While we do not quarrel with the Department's 
characterization of the districts' activities as involving 
purchases and sales of disposal service and capacity, we cannot 
agree with its conclusion that the waste flow regulations, 
therefore, cannot be violative of the dormant Commerce Clause.  
When a public entity participates in a market, it may sell and 
buy what it chooses, to or from whom it chooses, on terms of its 
choice; its market participation does not, however, confer upon 
it the right to use its regulatory power to control the actions 
of others in that market.  In Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 
(1992), for example, an Oklahoma statute required all electrical 
utilities in the state, including state-owned utilities, to burn 
a mixture of coal containing at least ten percent Oklahoma-mined 
coal.  The Court recognized that Oklahoma could legitimately 
impose this restriction on state-owned utilities because, as a 
market participant, it was entitled to make its own decisions 
regarding energy source purchases.  That fact did not, however, 
immunize from dormant Commerce Clause review its attempt to 
regulate the behavior of others in the market.  As we have 
earlier noted, the Court applied heightened scrutiny and found 
the statute invalid.20  Oklahoma's participation in the market as 
an electricity producer did not permit it to regulate in a 
discriminatory manner privately owned utilities in the same 
market. 
 Under New Jersey's solid waste disposal program, the 
districts are doing more than making choices about what waste 
they will accept even in those instances where the district owns 
the designated facility.  The waste flow regulations purport to 
control the market activities of private market participants.  
Those regulations do not concern only the manner of operation of 
the government-owned or government-managed designated disposal 
facilities; they require everyone involved in waste collection 
and transportation to bring all waste collected in the district 
to the designated facilities for processing and disposal.  They 
do not merely determine the manner or conditions under which the 
government will provide a service, they require all participants 
in the market to purchase the government service--even when a 
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. The Court refused to uphold that portion of the statute 
that applied specifically to the state-owned utility after 
determining that it could not be severed from the remaining 
provisions.  Wyoming, 112 S. Ct. at 802-04.  In so doing, the 
Court stated:  "We leave to the Oklahoma Legislature to decide 
whether it wishes to burden this state-owned utility when private 
utilities will otherwise be free of the Act's restrictions."  Id. 
at 804. 
better price can be obtained on the open market.  New Jersey's 
waste flow control regulations were thus promulgated by it in its 
role as a market regulator, not in its capacity as a market 
participant.  As a result, those regulations are not immune from 
review under the Commerce Clause.   
  
 V. 
 Because we conclude that the waste flow regulations 
discriminate against interstate commerce on their face or in 
effect, and that they are not protected from dormant Commerce 
Clause scrutiny under the market participant exception, the only 
remaining question is whether the regulations can survive the 
heightened scrutiny test.  "[O]nce a state law is shown to 
discriminate against interstate commerce either on its face or in 
practical effect, the burden falls on the State to demonstrate 
both that the statute serves a legitimate local purpose, and that 
this purpose could not be served as well by available 
nondiscriminatory means."  Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 121, 138 
(1986) (internal quotations and citation omitted).  While 
Atlantic Coast urges us to decide whether the Department has so 
demonstrated, we decline to do so.    
 When the district court decided this case, C & A 
Carbone had not been decided and J. Filiberto Sanitation v. 
Department of Environmental Protection, 857 F.2d 913 (3d Cir. 
1988), was the law of this circuit.  Understandably relying on 
Filiberto, the district court balanced the benefits to New Jersey 
against the burden on interstate commerce under Pike.  It 
therefore had no occasion to consider whether the Department had 
accomplished the much more onerous task of demonstrating that 
there is no alternative to its waste flow control regulations 
that would accomplish its legitimate objectives. 
 The parties compiled a very substantial record in the 
district court, much of which consisted of live testimony the 
district court had the benefit of hearing.  Based on that record, 
it is not difficult to believe the Department and the amici when 
they insist that New Jersey has one of the most serious and 
complex solid waste problems in the country.  At the same time, 
it is apparent from the record that the feasibility and 
effectiveness of alternative measures pose technologically and 
economically complex issues.  While these issues have been 
touched upon in the briefing before us, it is fair to say that 
they have not been the focus of the parties' efforts on this 
appeal.21  In this context, we believe that this court, the 
parties, and the public deserve the benefit of the district 
court's views before this controversy is finally resolved. 
 We are mindful of the fact that New Jersey has vowed 
not to abandon its present system until compelled to do so and of 
Atlantic Coast's contention that it suffers more irreparable 
                     
21
. The district court is in a far better position than we 
to evaluate whether the focus of the efforts of the parties 
before it would have been substantially the same had C & A 
Carbone been earlier decided.  Accordingly, we leave it to the 
discretion of the district court in the first instance whether to 
resolve the remaining issues, including the issue of the 
appropriate form of relief if relief is to be granted, on the 
basis of the current record or to reopen the record for 
supplementary evidence. 
injury with each passing month.  We note, however, that Atlantic 
Coast is free at any time to apply again for pendente lite 
relief.  The district court's prior decision to deny such relief 
was based primarily on its conclusion that Atlantic Coast had 
failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of 
its challenge.  This conclusion was based in turn on its view 
that the more lenient Pike test was the applicable one.  After  
C & A Carbone, the likelihood of success issue is a materially 




 Because the waste flow regulations discriminate against 
interstate commerce by restricting the access of out-of-state 
facilities to waste processing and disposal service markets, they 
can be upheld only if they can survive the heightened scrutiny 
required by C & A Carbone.  Because the district court analyzed 
the waste flow regulations under the more lenient Pike balancing 
test, we will remand for application of the appropriate test.  
For the foregoing reasons, the district court's judgment in favor 
of the Department will be reversed and this case will be remanded 
for further proceeding consistent with this opinion. 
